Article
The Algorithm That Denied the Care
Predicting how long a patient's recovery should take and deciding how long that recovery is allowed to take are two different acts. A length-of-stay model can blur them by default, without a single explicit choice, simply because its output arrives already looking like an answer, and no one is assig
- Published
- August 11, 2026
- Updated
- August 19, 2026
- Reading time
- 12 min

The Global Signal
UnitedHealthcare and its subsidiary naviHealth use an algorithm called nH Predict to estimate how much post-acute care, skilled nursing, inpatient rehabilitation, home health, a Medicare Advantage patient is likely to need after a hospital stay. A federal lawsuit, Estate of Lokken v. UnitedHealth Group, filed in the District of Minnesota in November 2023, alleges that UnitedHealth used nH Predict's estimates to cut off coverage for patients whose own doctors had recommended continued care, and that the company knowingly deployed an algorithm with what the complaint calls a 90 percent error rate, meaning nine in ten denials were reversed when families pursued an appeal. That figure comes from the plaintiffs' own filing; it has not been independently established by a court, and the case remains in active litigation. A February 13, 2025 ruling dismissed the plaintiffs' unjust-enrichment and bad-faith insurance claims as preempted by the federal Medicare Act, while allowing breach-of-contract and breach-of-the-implied-covenant-of-good-faith claims to proceed. A March 9, 2026 discovery order compelled UnitedHealth to turn over internal documentation describing how the algorithm was designed, trained, and reviewed.
Separately, a November 14, 2023 STAT News investigation, based on internal documents and interviews with former employees, reported that UnitedHealth set a 2023 target requiring case managers to keep patients' rehab stays within 1 percent of the algorithm's projected days, with case managers who fell outside that target facing discipline. Reporting on the same investigation describes an earlier, looser target of roughly 3 percent in 2022, tightened to that 1 percent figure the following year; this draft treats the 2023 figure as directly confirmed from the published article and the 2022 comparison point as consistently corroborated secondary reporting on the same investigation, not independently re-verified against the original article's full (subscriber-only) text.
Error rate the complaint alleges UnitedHealth knowingly deployed in nH Predict
Directly confirmed via CBS News' report quoting the complaint's own language; not an independent court finding, and the case remains in active litigation as of the March 9, 2026 discovery order.
Nobody votes to make that substitution. It happens because the model's output arrives already looking like an answer.
What changes when the exception has a named owner
A length-of-stay estimate and a coverage decision are not the same thing until an organization lets them become one by default.
Naming who may override the model's estimate, and tracking the model's own appeal-reversal rate as a standing metric, closes the gap this case shows compounding for roughly a year before external litigation surfaced it.
Why the Visible Metric Misleads
An internal margin target, keep actual length of stay within a small percentage of the model's prediction, measures whether the organization is following its own model faithfully. It says nothing about whether the model's prediction was the right amount of care for a given patient, and it creates no natural signal when the two diverge, because divergence from the model is exactly what the target is built to suppress. The more revealing measure sits one layer over: the rate at which a model's own denials are reversed on internal appeal, tracked as its own standing metric rather than surfacing only inside litigation years later. A 90-percent-scale reversal rate, if UnitedHealth's own case-management data in fact showed one anywhere close to that scale, is not a rounding error in an otherwise sound process; it is close to an admission that the model's initial call was usually wrong, sitting unreviewed as a decision because no one had been assigned to compare denials against appeals as a matter of course.
The Leadership Move
The right move is not to stop using predictive models in utilization management, which most large payers rely on for legitimate planning purposes. It is to make explicit, before deployment, what the model is allowed to decide unilaterally and what it may only inform, with a named clinical reviewer authorized to override it, and to track the model's own reversal-on-appeal rate as a standing operational metric, not a fact that only surfaces once a lawsuit compels its disclosure.
- Ownership
Care-management operations typically own the workflow that applies the model's output. Clinical leadership owns whether a physician's judgment can override that output without friction. Legal and compliance own the exposure created when the two are not explicitly reconciled. When no one owns the explicit boundary between "the model's estimate" and "the coverage decision," the boundary defaults to whichever function faces the least resistance to enforcing it, in this case, the workflow that denies by default.
- Tradeoff
Building in a routine, low-friction override path costs real management attention and slows the throughput a length-of-stay model is partly meant to protect. The alternative, an internal appeal-reversal rate approaching the scale alleged in this case, sitting undetected until external litigation forces its disclosure, is a substantially larger cost, in both the settlement exposure and the two years or more of unreviewed denials the STAT reporting and the litigation timeline together suggest occurred before the pattern became public.
- Human consequence
Patients and families experienced individual coverage denials as final, medical decisions, not as the output of an internal margin target most of them never knew existed. By the time an appeal succeeded, in nearly nine of ten cases according to the plaintiffs' own account, the disruption to a recovery already in progress, a transfer, a gap in care, a family scrambling to appeal, had already happened.
Implication for Operators
A standing review comparing a utilization-management model's initial denials against its own internal appeal outcomes is not an exotic capability; it is closer to the same discipline Transformidy's decision-governance lens already asks of any organization relying on a metric to stand in for a decision, does anyone routinely check whether the model's calls survive a second look, and is that check built into ongoing operations or does it only happen when a lawsuit demands it. Every month a reversal-on-appeal pattern goes unreviewed as its own metric is a month it compounds, unnoticed, the way the STAT reporting shows this one appears to have compounded across roughly a year of tightening internal margin targets before the lawsuit surfaced it publicly.
nH Predict was built to estimate recovery time. The lawsuit against UnitedHealth is not really about whether that estimate was accurate; it is about whether anyone at the organization was assigned to notice when the estimate and the coverage decision quietly became the same thing, and to check, on a standing basis, whether that fusion was producing correct outcomes.
A flawed prediction is not the problem. A prediction allowed to function as a clinical decision, with no standing review of how often it was wrong, is the problem, and it took a lawsuit to make the reviewing unavoidable.
Before automating a workflow or routing rule, how explicitly does your organization decide what the system should optimize for and who owns exceptions?
FAQ
Has a court ruled that nH Predict has a 90 percent error rate?
No. That figure comes from the plaintiffs' complaint, and the case remains in active litigation. A February 13, 2025 ruling allowed breach-of-contract and good-faith claims to proceed while dismissing others as preempted by federal Medicare law, and a March 9, 2026 order compelled document production, but no court has independently established the error rate as fact.
What did UnitedHealth's own internal targets show, independent of the lawsuit?
A November 14, 2023 STAT News investigation, based on internal documents and former-employee interviews, reported that UnitedHealth's 2023 target required case managers to keep patient stays within 1 percent of the algorithm's projected days, tightened from a looser 2022 target reporting on the same investigation puts at roughly 3 percent, meaning care teams faced increasing pressure to keep actual patient stays close to the algorithm's prediction.
Is the problem that the algorithm's predictions were inaccurate?
The more precise problem, per the litigation and the STAT reporting together, is that a planning-oriented estimate was used to set a coverage boundary without an explicit, low-friction path for a treating physician to override it, and without a standing internal metric tracking how often that boundary turned out to be wrong on appeal.
How would a standing appeal-reversal review have changed anything?
If UnitedHealth's own internal appeal outcomes had been tracked as a routine operating metric rather than something that surfaced through litigation, a reversal rate anywhere near the scale the complaint alleges would have been visible to the organization itself within the ordinary review cycle that produced the STAT-reported margin data, rather than becoming public only after a lawsuit and a multi-year discovery process.
Does this mean predictive models should not be used in utilization management?
No. The distinction is between a model used to inform a reviewer's judgment, with a named person authorized to override it, and a model whose output quietly becomes the decision itself because no one explicitly drew that line.
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